EDITORIAL NOTES..
In Toomey v. Southern Pacific R.
R. Co., 86 Cal., 374, plaintiff's son,
a boy eighteen years of age, was
killed by a special train of the defendant while walking along the
tracks at a place i5o yards from a
public crossing. There was no
crossing of any kind where the accident happened, and deceased was
a trespasser. The accident happened in the night; and the engine,
which was running stern foremost,
had no head-light, nor was the bell
rung or the whistle blown at the
crossing as required by law. None
of the employees saw deceased until
afterhe was hurt. The Court, without a jury, gave judgment for the
defendant. The Court held that
the whistle and bell were for the
benefit of people using the crossing, not for trespassers, hence the

failure of the engineer to use them
at the crossing was not negligence
as far as decedent was concerned.
See, also, Craddock v. Louisville
& N. R. R. Co., i6 Southwest. Rep.,
125 (Ken.), where plaintiff attempted to cross in front of a train
going at the rate of fifteen to twenty
miles an hour-unreasonably fast
-within the limits of a village, and
was struck and injured. Held:
That he could not recover.
See, also, Rome R. R. Co. v. Tolbert, 85 Ga., 447; June v. B. & A.
R. R. Co., 153 Mass., 79; Johnson
v. Truesdale, 48 Northwest. Rep.,
1136; Boyd v. %VabashWestern Ry.
Co., 16 Southwest. Rep., 909; Georgia Pacific Ry. Co. v. Lee, 9 South.
Rep., 230 (Ala.).
W. WHARTON SMITH,

Philadelphia, Pa.

EDITORIAL NOTES.
BY W. D. L.
AN article on the constitutionality of the leases of the
Lehigh Valley Railroad and the New Jersey Central Railroad by the Reading Railroad Company will appear in the
May number of the AMERICAN LAW REGISTER AND
REVIEW.
THE WORK OF THE LATE MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY.-

The death of Mr. Justice BRADLEY removes one who for
the past twenty-one years has been a member of "the ideal
tribunal." No one but his fellow-judges, who have come
in daily contact with him, can rightly estimate the extent
of the influence which he had on the development of jurisprudence; for we are told that it is in the consultationroom that merit, learning and the clearness of one's ideas
are best tested. No show of knowledge which one does
not possess, no glitter which apes ability, can long deceive
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those with whom we are engaged in a common intellectual
labor. And yet, even if we did not have the testimony of
his colleagues, we could not have failed to realize the
weight in the councils of a court which that man must
have who, like the late Justice, evinced in his written
opinions such an intimate acquaintance with all branches
of the common and constitutional law of his own country
and with the judicial systems of continental Europe, and
who showed by the accuracy of his citations in oral stateinents of the law during the argument of a case the wonderful retentiveness of his memory.
The members of the profession have two sources from
which they can judge a judge: the way in which he conducts the business of the court while on the bench, and his
written opinions. The first, in a member of an appellate
court; is the lesser of the two in importance, and yet no
mention of the late Justice would be complete without
some notice of his marvellous aptitude for what one may
call "judicial business." It was wonderful to see the
quickness and unfailing accuracy with-which he applied
abstract principles of law to .the concrete cases which came
before him in the Circuit Court. The highest, compliment
which a Pennsylvanian could give was paid to him by one
of the leading members of the bar of that State, when he
said : "In the manner of Judge SHARSWOOD, Justice
BRADLEY cleared the list."
But it is from his reported opinions, and especially his
opinions in cases involving the construction of the Constitution, that Mr. Justice BRADLEY will live in history. In a
short time, so quickly do we forget the minor points of a
great man's work, by these constitutional opinions alone
will he be judged. Whether, as time passes, that judgment will become more or less favorable, depends largely
on whether the future members of the Court follow his conceptions of the true meaning of the important clauses of
the Constitution. For with our judiciary, as with mankind
in general, greatness which comes from "ideas" endures
only so long as those ideas influence human thought or
conduct.
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Nothing will show us more clearly the point of view
from which Mr. Justice BRADLEY regarded constitutional
questions than an analysis of some of the opinions and dissents written by him in the more important cases which
came before the Supreme Court during his term of office.
To examine first
The Slaughter-House Cases.
Few cases have been considered by the Supreme
Court with a more abiding sense of their importance; few
seem to be fraught with greater peril to the liberties of the individual citizen; few have had such little practical effect.
The reason for this will probably be found in the fact that
what the Court actually decided was not, as a constitutional
question, of great importance. At the same time, the
opinion of the Court contained statements of constitutional
law of great moment. But to-day the dicta of the minority
more nearly represent the attitude of the members of the
Supreme Bench than do the dicta of Mr. Justice Miller,
who-spoke for the majority of. his brethren. That the
opinion. of the Court went beyond what was actually necessary for the decision of the case is evident., The majority
of the Court held that the Act of Louisiana, granting to a
corporation the monopoly of slaughtering cattle over a
territory 1, 154 square miles in '.extent, and containing the
city of New Orleans and adjacent territory, was constitutional. The business of slaughtering cattle, the Court
maintained, was under the police power of the State, and
the act was a police measure, legitimately framed to protect the health of -the community. Mr. Justice Bradley,
who was among those who delivered a dissenting opinion,
admitted that it the measure was, in its operation, well
suited to.protect the health of the community, there would
be no doubt of its constitutionality. He, therefore, agreed
with the majority of the Court on the important question
of law which arose in the case-viz., whether a State
could create a monopoly to carry out its health laws; but
he differed from the majority on the mixed question of
law and fact-whether the law of Louisiana was a law
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designed to protect the health of the people of New
Orleans. He did not think it was, but, on the contrary,
considered the law as establishing a monopoly of an important industry, without one iota of public expediency to
recommend it.
In the opinion of the Court, h6wever, Mr. Justice
Miller, after stating the law to be one designed to protect
the health of the citizens of the State, went on to uphold
the power of the State to grant monopolies. He says:
"The proposition is, therefore, reduced to these terms:
Can any 6xclusive privileges be granted to any of its citi:
zens or a corporation by the legislature of a State?" But,
curiously, instead of discussing the power of the legislature to grant the exclusive privilege to carry out its police
laws, he goes into the whole subject of monopolies, and upholds the power of the State to grant monopolies and
privileges generaliy. It is this power that Mr. Justice
Bradley and the other dissenting judges vehemently deny,
and it is in connection with ihis denial that the late Justice
sets forth with admirable clearness the following conception
of the last amendments to the Constitution. These amendments declare that there is a citizeiship of the United States,
and they protect the rights which appertain to that citizenship from encroachment by the States. The rights of the
citizen are the rights of free-born Englishmen. One of the
most valuable is the right to carry on any trade and occupation, hampered only by reasonable restrictions. Furthermore, depriving a man by legislative enactment of his
right to carry on a particular trade, is not only interfering
with his right as a citizen of the United States, but also
deprives him of his liber.ty and property without lue process of law. This latter contention was dismissed without
argument by Mr. Justice Miller. In his lengthy exposition
of the question of "citizenship," however, that Justice
advanced a radically different conception of the amendments. He thought they were, as a matter of fact, designed
primarily to prevent discriminations by the State against
the colored man, and, in their construction, this fact, which
indicated their main object, should always be. kept in view.
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The only privileges and immunities which were protected
by the amendments were those which affected citizens of
the United States as such. Citizenship of the United States

and citizenship of the State were, in his view, two different
things.

In the amendments those who are citizens of the

States are pointed out, but the privileges and immunities
of such citizenship are neither defined nor protected. The,
only rights which are protected from the encroachments of
'State legislatures are the privileges of the citizen of the
United States, and these are those wlich belonged to the
-citizens of every national government. As an instance of
a national privilege is mentioned the right of a citizen of
the United States to go to the seat of the Federal Government. The rights of a citizen of the United States are not
the rights of trade and commerce within a State. In fact,
we can deduce from Mr. Justice Miller's opinion that all
those rights which are exercised solely within the State,
and do not pertain to the national government, are left for
their protection to the discretion of State legislatures.
We hope there is little doubt that Mr. Justice Bradley's
conclusion, that no State can create a monopoly pure and
simple, would be adopted to-day by the Court, on the ground
that granting a monopoly would be depriving the individual
of -hisright to carry on a lawful calling, which right is his
by virtue of his being a citizen of the United States, and
perhaps also on the ground that it would deprive him of his
property and liberty without due process of law.
Certainly, the words of the XIVth Amendment, as construed by Mr. Justice Miller, do not, as was intended, add
any additional security to our liberties. The United States
was a nation before the amendments; and the people of
the States were members of that nation, and as such each
had the right which belongs to the inhabitants of any free
government to go to the seat thereof, travel from one part
to another, or assemble to petition for redress of grievances.
We cannot but believe that, as the importance of individual
liberty becomes more and more impressed upon our minds,
the following quotation from Mr. Justice Bradley's dissent
will more and more fully echo our own sentiments and the
sentiments of the great tribunal which he graced so long.
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He says : "The mischief to be remedied (by the amendments) was not merely slavery and its incidents and conse-"
quences, but that spirit of insubordination to the. national
government which had troubled the country for so many
years in some of the States, and that intolerance of free
speech and free discussion which often rendered life and
property insecure and led to much unequal legislation. The
amendment was an attempt to give voice to that strong
national yearning for that time and that condition of things
in which American citizenship should be a sure guarantee
of safety, and in which every citizen of the United States
might stand erect in every portion of its soil in the full
enjoyment of every right and privilege belonging to freemen, without fear of violence or molestation."
This strong statement of the belief that the amendments provided for the complete protection of individual,
liberty will do more to preserve the name of the great jurist
than probably any other single opinion of his in the reports.
The Legal Tender Cases.
The keynote of the late Justice's opinion of the powers
of the Federal Government is found in his expression in the
Legal Tender Cases:' "The United States is not only a
government, but a national government." As such, he
argued, it has all those powers which rightly belong and
are necessary to the preservation of the nation. The real
question involved in the Legal Tender Cases was with him,
as with Mr. Justice Field, who dissented, whether a national republican government, in the exercise of its control
over the currency of the country (with complete control
over which, Mr. justice Bradley contended, it is, as a national
government invested), can incidentally take the property, of
one man and give it to another. This is what making bills
"legal tender" means. No one can read Mr. Justice Field's
dissent on this point without being impressed with its force.
The question .itself is one of those on which men of trained
intellects will always hold different views. The power of
the governmient to protect and preserve itself, and the right
'8 Wall., 555.
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*of the individual to his property, are two fundamental
principles in constitutional law. In the facts of the Legal
Tender Cases they apparently came in direct conflict. The
national government, from its nature and the duties and
responsibilities which devolve upon it as defender of the
people from domestic and external violence, undoubtedly
ought to possess greater control over individual liberty and
property than the State governments. At the same time it
is equally true that there are principles of individual liberty
which a national government ought not to be allowed to
trample under foot. No one would pretend for an instant
that the property of all men over six feet high could be confiscated by the national government on the pretence of
saving the country. On the other hand, a tax on all creditors of twenty per cent. on their debts, collected when payment was made, would undoubtedly be constitutional. The
facts of the Legal Tender Cases stand between these two
extremes. We think that Mr. Justice Bradley was right.
It is certain that the majority of the bar and of laymen
approve of the decision. The value of his opinion, however, lies not in the particular conclusions to which he
came from the facts before the Court, but in the point of
view which the opiftion adopts toward the powers of Congress. To say that this view will remain and grow in favor
with the bench, the bar and the whole country, is saying
nothing more than that we will continue to be one people,
under one ndlionalgovernment.
Chicago, St. Paul,etc., R. R. Co. v. Mfinzesola.'
Mr. Justice Bradley differed with the majority of his
brethren in his last years of service on the bench on a subject which is likely to be one of great importance during
the next decade. As in the Slaughter-house Cases, the
question arises out of the XIVth Amendment. It is also the
result of the laws of some of the States which appoint
railroad commissions, vested with power to regulate the
rates of fare charged by common carriers on passengers
and merchandise transported from place to place in the
'134 U. S., 418.
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State. - In the above case the majority of the Court, Mr.Justice Blatchford writing the opinion, held, that, while a
grant to the directors in the charter of a railroad of the
right to regulate the rates of fare does not prevent the
States from declaring subsequently, through a general law,
that all rates of fare should be reasonable, yet, nevertheless, a State cannot prescribe unreasonablerates. And the
majority further decided that the judiciary are the final arbitrators of the question, what are reasonable rates? If,

therefore, the legislature directly fixed unreasonable rates,
or the commission appointed by the legislature fixed rates
unreasonable in the eyes of the Court, the act was in contravention of the XIVth Amendment, in that it deprived
the railroad of its property without due process of law.
Mr. Justice Bradley, in his dissent, took the position,
that since the legislature had the power to fix the rates to
be charged for public services, such as the transportation
of passengers and goods, it should be the final tribunal to
determine whether a specific rate is reasonable. And,
furthermore, the question of the proper specific rate in any
case. being essentially an "administrative" question, the
State legislatures could constitutionally delegate the
power to determine the rate of fare in any specific instance
to a commission, or even to the courts. In such a case the
courts would act as a commission and determine an administrative or, in other words, an executive question. Thus
the courts became, as far as the act relating to railway
fares was concerned, the executive. Under the acts of the
legislature which simply provide general rules for the
guidane of the courts in prescribing the rates of fare in
any instance, the judges determine the rate as would a railroad commission, or the governor of a State under similar
circumstances. 'But it was for the legislature to say who
should determine in a specific instance the rates to be
charged by one carrying on a public employment. The
proper rate to charge is a legislative and executive but not
a judicial question.
In the present confused state of our ideas concerning
what is a judicial, what is a legislative, or what is an
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administrative or executive question, no one cAn say, with
full confidence that his opinion can be sustained by the
trend of authority, whether the reasonableness of a rate of
.fare, charged by a common carrier, ultimately
.will be considered a judicial question, as the majority of the Supreme
-Court consider it, or, with Mr. Justice Bradley, regarded
as a legislative question. But certainly the last position
appeals to us as the more consistent of the two. The
word "reasonable," applied in connection with the power
of the legislature to prescribe the charges for public employments, either means something or nothing. If it
means nothing, then the legislature has the right, as Mr.
Justice Bradley claimed, to prescribe any -rate of fare it
chooses. This is only another way of saying that the rate
established by the legislature, either directly or through a
commission, or court sitting as a commission, is necessarily
The act
reasonable, not simply Irima facie reasonable.
of Minnesota, which the Court declared unconstitutional,
attempted to do this very thing. The majority, therefore,
took the position that when they had said in Munn v.
Illinois, that the legislatures of the States had power to fix
reasonable rates for public employments, the word. reasonable meant something. The State legislatures alone being
able to prescribe what is reasonable, the reasonableness of
any rate becomes a fit subject for judicial investigation.
Now, the inevitable consequences of this position, while
there are not palpable absurdities, are, nevertheless, to say
the least, extraordinary, in the extent of the power which
they place in the hands of the courts, and the way in which
they tie the hands of the State legislatures in respect to subjects over which it has always been considered they had absolute control-i e., the subjects under the Jolice fiower of
the State.
For instance, it may fairly be argued that in any specific instance there is more than one rate which may be
said to be reasonable, but no one can deny that there are
possibilities of rates being unreasonably high as well as
possibilities of rates being unreasonably low. If, then, a
legislature has no right to fix anything but a reasonable rate,
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suppose no rate is fixed by positive act of the legislature,
and the company, under permission of the legislature to "fix
rates," fixes a rate unreasonably high? The courts, in an
action by a shipper who had paid an unreasonably high
rate, would have either to allow him to recover, and in so
doing determine what was a reasonable rate for the service
of the common carrier, or affirm that the legislature, through
the directors of the company, had prescribed an unreasonable-rate. Whether under the Constifution of the United
States the legislatures of the States can prescribe rates of
fare that are unreasonable, may be a question, but it certainly cannot be open to doubt that no State court would
imply that the State Tegislature, by its failure to specify
or prescribe any rates of fare, had impliedly sanctioned any
rates of fare, no matter how unreasonable, which a carrier
company may choose to charge. Under the view of the
najority, therefore, State Railroad Commissions that are
not courts are utterly useless. Not only must their conclusions as to the reasonableness of any rate be reversed by
the Judiciary, but the Judiciary possesses a right, without
a commission, to declare, at the suit of any individual, that
the fare charged by a railroad company is unreasonable,
and, therefore, contrary to the will of the State legislature,
which, as a matter of courtesy, must be presumed to have
provided that the company could only charge reasonable
rates.
It may be stated as a general rule that the power to do
what another considers reasonable is no power at all. For
the last fifty years the courts have been upholding the
power of the State to make police regulations. The right
of the State to prescribe what a man shall charge when he
is carrying on a public employment, as a railroad or a
warehouse, was based on this police power. It is now proposed to take away the power by limiting the discretion of
the legislature to what the courts shall think reasonable.
It seems to us that the whole theory on which the right of
the State to regulate public charges is based is thus disregarded. It was thought to be based on the fact that when
a man takes up an employment, whose proper conduct is
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of*paramount interest to the community, he does so subject to the right of the public to regulate his actions. The
will of the people in this as in other respects is expressed
through the acts of their represeitatives in the legislature.
The opinion that the reasonableness of the act of the legislature is a judicialquestion, substitutes the will of the judges
for the will of the people. Mr. Justice Bradley clearly
foresaw this, and deeply regretted the inevitable conflict
between the courts and the legislature.
The Commerce Clause.
Outside the interpretation of the amendments, the
most iniportant work of the Court during the late Justice's
term was the development of the law relating to interstate
commerce. No other Justice, except Mr. Justice Miller,
has played such an important part in the development of
this, perhaps the most complicated branch of constitutional law, and the one on whose proper application rests
the future industrial prosperity of the country. Mr. Justice Bradley and his associates found the law relative
to interstate commerce involved in doubt. To-day, as a
result of their labors, many principles which can be
applied to the majority of new cases as they arise have
been firmly established. With the most important and
far-reaching of these the name of Mr. Justice Bradley,
together with that of Mr. Justice Field, will always be indissolubly connected. The question of the nature of the
power of Congress over commerce had often engrossed the
attention of the Court. Some judges thought the power
was concurrent in the States, others exclusive in Congress.
The members of the Court, during the time of Chief Justice Taney, seemed to labor between two difficulties. If
the Stales had a concurrent power over commerce, there
appeared to be no limit to the extent of the possible interference of State legislatures in the intercourse between
citizens of different States. The main purpose of the
' more perfect union"I was to prevent this interference.
On the other hand, if the power was not exclusively in
Congress, were, not the State pilot laws unconstitutional ?
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Mr. Justice Curtis apparently solved this difficulty in
Cooley v. Port Wardens, when he pointed out that the
nature of a Federal power depended upon the subjects
over which it was exercised ; and, therefore, as commerce
embraced a multitude of subjects, it was evident that over
some, as pilots, the concurrent power of the State extended, while others, as imports in the hands of the importer, were exclusively under the control of the Federal
Government. During the time of Justices Miller, Field
and Bradley, a complete change has taken place in the
attitude of the Court, and an important rule, first emphasized by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden,
has been firmly established. Chief Justice Marshall had
said: .
"All experience shows that the same measure
or measures, scarcely distinguishable from each other, may
flow from distinct powers, but this does not prove that the
powers themselves are identical."
This means that a
State, in the exercise of her reserved powers, can pass
many laws, such as pilot laws, which it would be competent for Congress to pass in the exercise of the power
over commerce. The fact that the power may be exclusively in Congress, does not prevent the State from
making a law whose purpose, as disclosed by its terms, is
fairly intended to improve the internal commerce of the
State, or to protect the health and morals of the people,
from being a constitutional law, though Congress might
have passed a similar law in the exercise of one of her exclusive powers. As far as interstate commerce is concerned,
the adoption of this principle ends the confusion which
arose from discussing a concurrent power of the State over
a subject which, as interstate and foreign commerce, is essentially national. One cannot but believe that its recognition is a distinct advance in our constitutional law.
For, trom the standpoint of political science, one of the
purposes of that law is to separate things national from
things local. In the complete development of constitutional
law, therefore, there can be no such thing as a subject
which is at once partly national and partly local. Natural19Wh.,

204.
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ization, for instance, ought to be a national matter or a
local or State matter. To declare that it is both would be
to invite confusion. The realization that interstate commerce, as such, is solely a national matter, but that neverthess there is nothing to prevent the States, in the exercise
of their reserved powers, from passing laws which Congress
might pass in the exercise of its exclusive power over such
a commerce, which is mainly due to Mr. Justice Field and
the late Justices Miller and Bradley, has, therefore, done
much to clarify our ideas on constitutional subjects.
An important adjunct to the above-mentioned theory,
in regard to the consequences of an exclusive power in the
Federal Government, is the doctrine which was developed
simultaneously with it, and known as that of the "silence
of Congress."
When the Court regarded the exclusive
power of Congress over commerce as not preventing the
States, in the absence of conflicting congressional legislation, from affecting commerce in the exercise of their police
powers, it immediately followed that any law of the State,
no matter how much it obstructed interstate commerce,
such as a bridge over an important river, was entirely
within the power of a State to enact, provided its main
object was one which it was competent for a State to
undertake. Such a result was to be profoundly deplored.
Justices Field and Bradley, in a long line of cases, commencing with Welton v. State of Missouri,' took the old
distinction between things over which Congress was supposed to have an exclusive control, and those over which
the States were supposed to have a concurrent power, and
formulated and applied the now famous constitutional doctrine, that the silence of Congress respecting regulations
of subjects in their nature national must be taken by the
courts as an indication of its will that commerce in this
respect should be free from State regulations; but over certain other subjects, such as pilots, over which it used to be
contended that the concurrent power of the States extended,
then the non action or silence of Congress is no -indication
of its will that commerce in this respect should be free from
191 U. S., 275.
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State regulations, and, therefore, State laws which affect
these subjects do not conflict with the will of Congress.
Thus, though the way of regarding the power of the States
in respect to commerce was modified, hardly a case had to
be overruled.
The practical effect of this interpretation of the coinmerce clause of the Constitution is a masterpiece of judicial
legislation. It requires that the consent of the Federal
authority should first be obtained before a particular locality
essays to embark on legislation, which, however necessary
to preserve the morals of the citizens, profoundly affects the
commerce of the whole country. But when once the whole
nation decides that such local legislation may, in some instances, be desirable, the particular regulations are enacted
by the States, which.alone are familiar with local conditions.
This examination of the opinions of the late Justice
might be continued indefinitely. We cannot dignify a
sketch which has simply touched the outskirts of his work
-with the name review. When we look over the long line
of decisions with which his name is connected, a feeling
akin to awe and reverence comes over us. Of awe, at the
magnitude of the work ; of reverence, at the greatness of
the intellect which solved such a variety of problems.
Surely, the late Justice was one of those men of whom we,
as Americans, can be justly proud. He combined in his
own person and character the two strong points of the
Anglo-Saxon: a great and wide practical knowledge of men
and things, combined with the power of concentration and
subjective analysis. At. his death, the bench, bar and
country lost one who, for the clearness of his thought and
for the thoroughness of his acquaintance with all subjects
connected with his profession, was perhaps without a
superior in the history of our judiciary.
NOTICE.
Book Reviews, omitted from this number on account
of lack of space, will appear in the May issue.

